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ABSTRACT We investigate attitudes toward voting reforms that attribute greater 
weight to younger generations in a survey experiment. The main assumption of 
this research is that due to the distortions caused by elite discourse, voters are not 
aware of the intergenerational inequality of redistribution, thus attempts to change 
the voting system – that currently provides an equal vote to each voter, thereby 
maintaining inequality – would not get sufficient public support.
After providing a review of potential voting reforms for improving intergenerational 
justice, we present results from an online survey sample of one thousand 
respondents. The data show that presenting the arguments for intergenerational 
justice increases the sensitivity of younger voters towards the political rights of 
young generations, but does not improve the acceptance of such reforms among the 
middle-aged and the elderly.
KEYWORDS: intergenerational justice, voting right, survey-experiment, 
Hungary
INTRODUCTION
Our study examines support for voting-rights reforms that could better 
represent the interests of young and future generations compared to current 
voting systems based on equal votes. These reforms include giving additional 
votes to families with children; increasing the weight attributed to younger 
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voters; and decreasing the voting age. We do not focus on the sociodemographic 
background to the current attitudes. Rather, we investigate the relationship 
between public discourse and support for the such voting-rights reforms. 
The research question employed in the study concerned how the framing of 
state redistribution mechanisms affects the sensitivity of young generations 
to the voting rights of future generations. The main methodology for this 
research was a framing survey experiment involving respondents reacting to 
the survey after having been presented with specific forms of information about 
redistribution-related dilemmas.
First, we assume that in the public discourse about the role of the state the 
intergenerational aspects of state redistribution are usually neglected. Therefore, 
voters do not perceive the intergenerational injustice of current welfare regimes, 
resulting in their being insensitive to the intergenerational justice coded into 
the current voting system. Survey-based experiments can simulate the long-
term effects of complex discourses to a certain extent, as well as the short-term 
effects of presenting several aspects of the problem to respondents. Using such 
a survey experiment with pre-survey framing we were able to investigate these 
effects. We assume that such an analysis could help with understanding the role 
of public discourses on attitudes.
In our experiment the online sample of one thousand adults were split into four 
groups of equal size. The first group of respondents answered three questions 
related to voting-rights reforms without any manipulations, and thus served as 
the control group. The questions focused on support for voting-rights reforms 
that award greater voting weight to younger generations. Another randomly 
generated group watched a short framing video that discussed state redistribution 
dilemmas in line with the current public discourse before completing the survey, 
which also contained a few attitude-related questions before the questions 
on voting-rights reforms. The framing video for this group highlighted the 
intragenerational aspects of redistribution, including the dilemmas involved in 
supporting the poor via taxation of the working population. 
The third random group was presented with information similarly framed, 
but in their case the framing video highlighted intergenerational redistribution 
issues through presenting the dilemma of making elderly or large families the 
beneficiaries of redistribution. 
The fourth group did not watch a framing video but were exposed to some 
priming questions in their survey that intentionally conflated Roma people with 
large families and those on welfare before the questions about voting rights.  
Our results partially confirm our expectations, and suggest that presenting 
information about aspects of intergenerational redistribution does increase the 
sensitivity of younger respondents to the political rights of younger generations, 
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but does not decrease the overall level of rejection of voting-rights reforms 
among the middle-aged and the elderly. An interesting result is that better 
educated respondents are more likely to reject such reforms than less educated 
respondents. 
In the following section we review issues surrounding intergenerational 
justice and the reforms of voting rights that have been proposed in this domain. 
These suggestions served as a basis for the survey. We then describe the theories 
and results used to formulate our hypotheses that explain voter preferences 
relating to the dilemmas of intergenerational redistribution. The following two 
sections present the methodology and the results. We conclude by summarizing 
our results and giving an overview of the lessons learned during this work.
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE:  
THE CLASHING INTERESTS OF GENERATIONS
Our research focuses on the potential for voting-rights reforms that ensure 
the representation of future generations’ interests to a much greater degree than 
current systems. Here, we do not aim to give a detailed analysis, but rather 
constrain ourselves to a discussion of the political possibilities of these reforms.
The decisions of current generations influence future generations’ possibilities 
negatively in many aspects. The most frequently mentioned domains are 
environmental problems (Arnell 1999; Hackl and Pruckner 2003; Lumer 2009) 
and the fiscal policies that lead to the accumulation of public debt (Alesina and 
Tabellini 1990; Kopits 2007; Penner and Steuerle 2007). In the current decade 
not only has the concept of intergenerational justice became more prominent 
in these domains, but several indicators have been developed to allow related 
comparisons across countries (McQuilkin 2018; Vanhuysse 2013b).
The importance of environmental factors is widely accepted today among the 
majority, yet the policies that are designed to save natural resources and react 
to climate change are often rejected due to the conflicting interests of private 
consumption. Put another way, this involves a collective action dilemma: 
individuals create a “public bad” – although they know what should be done, 
they are not willing to do it (Hauert, Wakano, and Doebeli 2008). This is despite 
the fact that over the last two decades (due to the rise in awareness about these 
issues) governmental actors have put considerable effort into conserving the 
Earth’s natural state and dealing with the challenge of the overuse of natural 
resources, with the support of most of the public of developed countries.
Although the environment is a key topic in intergenerational justice and 
ideas about sustainable development, our research focuses on another similarly 
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important issue that receives much less attention in public discourse: the effect 
of state overspending on future generations; or, in other words, accumulating 
government debt and other related fiscal balance issues (Buchanan and Wagner 
1977; Kopits 2007). Usually, decisions about public or governmental debt levels 
are considered under this topic, yet many consider the individual-level dilemma 
of childbearing to involve similar challenges. The former dilemma involves the 
accumulation of state debt and the sustainability of pension systems (Noord 
1993). State debt presents a threat to intergenerational justice, as for sustaining 
present generations in the future, the taxes and social contributions of future 
generations will be spent. This situation can be thought of as a sustainability 
issue for pension systems: active generations will need to provide such levels of 
support to elderly generations that they will not be able to support themselves 
as pensioners given current demographic trends (or only through increased tax 
burdens on future generations).
Our research question concerns how voters relate to the inequalities in the 
intergenerational redistribution of state expenditure. This dilemma has already 
been discussed by numerous economists in the domain of political behavior 
and state redistribution in the last decades by using the “selfish voter” model 
to explain redistribution outcomes. The basis of the rational voter model, 
meanwhile, is the clear and concise theoretical analysis of Browning (Browning 
1975). The rational voter in this model participates in a one-time vote about the 
parameters of the social security system (for the sake of simplicity, we focus on 
pension systems only), and each voter is driven by self-interest corresponding 
to their age. Elderly voters – pensioners – thus vote for large pensions and are 
not interested in the level of taxes and social contributions. Voters active on the 
labor market prefer to decrease current taxes and are indifferent about the level 
of their pensions. However, voters are not only selfish but they are prescient as 
well, hence those near retirement age would prefer high taxes and pensions as 
they consider that they would in the long term be better off under this scenario, 
even considering the present higher level of taxes. Thus, these voters may vote 
similarly to pensioners out of pure self-interest.
In Browning’s model, overspending on social security is caused by current 
pensioners, and those close to retirement age will vote for a pension system that 
is unsustainable in the long term to sustain their current pension and well-being 
at the expense of future generations.2 Based on this model, active middle-age 
voters would also favor a generous pension system, while younger voters would 
be against it.
2 For a more detailed analysis of this model, see Galasso and Profeta (Galasso and Profeta 2002).
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Browning’s model was later refined,3 but its main approach to political 
economics did not change: the claim remains that the elderly will support an 
unsustainable pension system, while youngsters may form a voting coalition 
against free-riding on future generations.
The explanations of such phenomena in classical sociology sharply contrast 
with self-interest based interpretations of economics. Yet, in our models this 
self-interest is replaced by a preference for collective interest representation 
based on class-consciousness.4 The conclusions of theories based on class-
consciousness make similar predictions to those of self-interest-based economic 
models regarding preferences for intragenerational redistribution. However, 
conclusions diverge in terms of intergenerational redistribution: class-solidarity 
may suppress the issues involved in intergenerational redistribution (Street 
and Cossman 2006). However, many sociologists have previously questioned 
the political behavioral models that rely on classical class theories and instead 
projected a struggle between different generations in postmodern welfare states 
(Foner 1974; Turner 1989, 1998). This model of political sociology is hardly 
distinguishable from the model of purely self-interest driven voters, yet the 
thesis of an age-class struggle has largely been rejected in mainstream political 
sociology (Hamil-Luker 2001; Irwin 1996, 1998; Street and Cossman 2006).
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE:  
ADVOCACY OF FUTURE GENERATIONS
Regarding the differences between generations, future generations are mostly at 
a disadvantage in terms of advocacy. In our study we refer to advocacy in political 
institutions and decision making as future generations cannot participate in 
decisions that influence their future lives directly. Future generations do not only 
include children of below voting age, but also those unborn children whose lives 
will be affected by any long-term decisions. Although these children currently do 
not have rights per se, they will have rights in the future that should be respected.5 
Hence when mentioning ‘long-term’ effects we refer to those effects that span 
generations –which the affected generations cannot influence at all.
Hence, the advocacy of future generations is hindered by the partial 
impossibility of interacting with the current (voting) generations. For the former 
3  For example, on the inclusion of the combined effect of in-family altruism and material inequalities, 
see Tabellini (Tabellini 2000).
4  See Manza and Brooks (Manza and Brooks 1999) for an overview.
5  For a thorough discussion of the future rights of children yet unborn, see Tremmel (Tremmel 2006).
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it is physically impossible to sanction any decision by current generations which 
might hurt them in the future – such decisions include economic decisions 
(superfluous state overspending), as well as environment-related decisions 
(deforestation, or the overuse of polluting technologies). Either decision 
could damage the well-being of future generations compared that of current 
generations. The self-advocacy of children would theoretically be possible, 
but of course children are usually not mentally mature enough to perceive the 
magnitude and consequences of such decisions. For the unborn, the option is not 
even theoretically possible.
In the following section we mention a few of the institutions dedicated to 
advocating for the rights of younger generations with the goal of dealing with the 
above-mentioned challenges. We describe two approaches: the representation of 
future generations via voting rights or institutions; and legislative constitutional 
and institutional barriers. Although our study focuses on voting-rights-related 
issues, we consider it important to have a brief look at other methods of 
representation.6
REPRESENTING FUTURE GENERATIONS – 
POLITICALLY, LEGALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY
Future generations can be represented directly by legal personnel or 
institutional bodies. In practice, such representation includes parliamentary 
advocates, or different committees (including environmental or economic 
committees). In the case of such forms of representation, although future 
generations are represented by the living and the issues under debate may be 
analyzed from the perspective of future generations specifically, the former do 
not participate in nominating the actual decision-making bodies. However, they 
may have veto-rights and some limited authority in decision-making. Thus, 
the most important prerequisite of such a representational body is political 
independence. 
A typical solution for the institutional representation of future generations 
in decision making is representation through fiscal councils and authorities 
(Debrun and Kumar 2008; Hagemann 2010). The activities of such bodies may 
include producing forecasts, reviewing budgetary planning, and even actual 
participation in decision-making. The most significant advantage of independent 
fiscal councils is that fiscal policy can thus be made independent from political 
cycles, hence better fiscal discipline can be created – provided that councils are 
6 These methods are discussed in detail by Jakab (Jakab 2016)
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indeed independent and possess sufficient authority with fiscal policy. There 
are many examples of such fiscal councils in EU countries, most of which play 
an advisory role in budgetary planning (Hagemann 2010). In Hungary, the 
Budgetary Council (Költségvetési Tanács) was founded as such an institution in 
2008, and makes proposals about annual budgets.
Future generations can also be represented by other committees and advocates 
(ombudsman) that are not necessarily related to fiscal policies. Examples include 
New-Zealand, Canada (commissioners) and Israel, Brazil, Germany, and Chile 
(committees). Unfortunately, Hungary is not among these countries, as while one 
such institute did exist (the institute of the Ombudsman for Future Generations 
(Jávor 2006; Jövő Nemzedékek Országgyűlési Biztosa 2008) it was abolished in 
2012 and was integrated into another institution that works with fundamental 
rights and has no specific focus on future generations, the Ombudsman For 
Fundamental Rights (Fülöp Sándor 2012).
It is easier to find examples of legal representation. In several legal cases a 
multitude of bodies have represented the interests of future generations (in these 
cases, the future generations were interpreted as the plaintiffs): federal states in 
the USA (Göpel 2009), a special court body in Australia (Department of Justice 
and Attorney General 1979), and simply a group of children in the Philippines 
(The Supreme Court of the Philippines 1993). In other cases, a single person 
(amicus curiae) whose knowledge may contribute to understanding the details 
of the case from the perspective of future generations may assist the work of 
the court. Strictly speaking, the animus curiae is not a direct representation of 
future generations, but rather a professional form of court support with a focus 
on upholding the interests of future generations (for a few recent examples, see 
Center for International Environmental Law 2017; Our Children’s Trust 2016).
The constitutional representation of future generations is also considered a form 
of legal representation. This usually covers the recognition of general responsibility 
towards future generations (as in the constitution of the Czech Republic, Poland, 
and Switzerland) or environmental responsibility (Italy, Netherlands, and Latvia). 
Debt brakes and upper limits on state deficits in constitutions (Finland, Germany, 
and Poland) should also be considered a form of representation of future 
generations, as respecting these limitations is in their interest.
Hungary’s constitution also includes several paragraphs similar to these 
mentioned above – involving the need for the protection of environmental and 
cultural goods, the call for restrictions on the size of the state debt, and principles 
for the use of public property. The role of the Parliamentary Commissioner of 
Future Generations was taken over by the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights 
and its institutional background, although enforcement of the constitutional 
clauses faces several obstacles not discussed here.
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REPRESENTATION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS – 
VOTING RIGHTS 
Providing the right to vote to children and delegating that right to their legal 
parents was proposed by Paul Demény (Demény 1986) and became publicly 
known as “Demeny-voting” (or “proxy-voting”). Among the three voting right 
reforms investigated in this paper, this approach has sparked the most debate 
and come closest to actually being introduced.
In the original concept, children are provided with a vote that is split between 
parents until the child reaches voting age. The proposal can easily be applied 
to to non-conventional families. The true novelty of this proposal is not that a 
child’s right is transferred to the parent, but that children are included among 
voters. This does not involve the direct representation of children, and does not 
address those not yet born, but we can assume that parents would cast votes so 
as to represent the interests of their children and other descendants. 
The introduction of Demeny-voting was considered in several countries 
as a means of representing future generations, including Japan (Aoki and 
Vaithianathan 2009, 2010; Vaithianathan, Aoki, and Sbai 2013), Germany 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003), and Austria (Vanhuysse 2013a). For various 
reasons, this proposal was not finally introduced.
A common counter-argument is that parents may not be competent to cast 
their children’s vote; furthermore, they could abuse this extra vote in their own 
self-interest. The first counter-argument may easily be refuted with the argument 
that if parents were unable to assess the effects of any political or economic 
decisions on their children’s well-being, they would similarly be incapable of 
doing this for themselves. Following this counter-argument, parents’ own rights 
to vote are made questionable.
In terms of parents misusing their children’s votes, there is some evidence 
that parents would cast the votes of their children for a different party than 
the one they would personally vote for (Aoki and Vaithianathan 2012). In the 
related study, more than one-tenth of respondents engaged in such behavior. 
However, these results do not document if the other respondents considered 
their own preferred party as a good alternative for their children, or if they were 
indifferent in this regard. Regardless, this experiment shows that voters would 
be willing to consider the interest of their children.
Besides this issue, there are other challenges to Demeny-voting. Governments 
may make decisions that affect not only the living, but also those not born yet. 
Extending and delegating voting rights would not be a solution to this. Another 
technical issue would be applying Demeny-voting to non-conventional families 
such as households with one parent, step-parents, and orphanages.
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Another option for empowering younger generations in a voting system is 
age-weighted voting. In this system the weight of an individual vote depends 
on the voter’s age. The basis of this idea is that younger voters have to live with 
the consequences of their votes for longer than elderly voters. Such reforms 
have not made their way into scientific discussions, but are the subject of 
media interest (Martin Hiesboeck 2016; Moraro 2016) and are presented as an 
interesting alternative. A recent analysis of the Brexit vote raises the issue of 
the potential consequences of using weighted votes to decide about issues of a 
similar historical weight (Nouvellet 2017).  
Alongside these possibilities, lowering the voting age in general often also 
arises as an alternative. There are a few examples of places where voters of less 
than 18 years old are allowed to vote (16 yrs: Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Somalia, 
Nicaragua; 17 yrs: East-Timor, Indonesia, Sudan, North-Korea), while in 
Germany the same was suggested regarding local elections (reducing the voting 
age to 16 years). Evidence for the positive effects of lowering the voting age is 
mixed. (Bergh 2013; McAllister 2014; Wagner, Johann, and Kritzinger 2012; 
Zeglovits and Zandonella 2013). Some studies find that that lowering the voting 
age increases the maturity of the youngest voters (at the age of 16), while others 
do not find evidence for this. Nonetheless, the common goal of these approaches 
is to foster the engagement of youth in democratic processes.
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC 
OPINION: EARLIER FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESES
In terms of intergenerational justice, young generations (especially those not 
yet born) are prone to be affected by the kindliness and responsibility of the 
currently active and the elderly. However, future generations have no influence 
on the decisions of the former, neither can they sanction decisions that will 
negatively affect them.
Preferences for intergenerational redistribution have been analyzed through 
attitudes towards the pension system, and studies have not confirmed predictions 
based on models premised on self-interest. This does not mean that age is not a 
main driver of attitudes towards pensions, but the effects of ideological concerns 
and status properties prove to be much stronger (Boeri, Boersch-Supan, and 
Tabellini 2002; Boeri and Pestieau 2004; Els, End, and Rooij 2003; Evans et 
al. 2004; Gelissen 2001; Hamil-Luker 2001; Silverstein et al. 2000; Street and 
Cossman 2006).
Current trends in economics and sociology highlight the possible impact of 
some universal moral sentiments driven by concerns of fairness independent of 
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self- or class-interest (in Hungarian see [Gulyás 2007]). These desires include 
a wish to respect “deservingness” and to respond to neediness in terms of the 
distribution of benefits. Polls indicate that the support of younger generations 
for the level of benefits for the elderly can be explained by a belief that the 
elderly have earned their benefits through their lives’ work. On the other hand, 
public opinion is much more divided in the case of benefits for children (the 
working force of future generations); one selection criterion is often the ethnic 
background of the family which would potentially benefit.
Both traditional models based on class solidarity and novel models driven by 
fairness concerns predict that excessive support for the elderly versus future 
generations is the result of a public discourse that is focused on intragenerational 
redistribution. People simply do not consider intergenerational justice and 
simply are not aware of the imbalance caused by redistribution. However, the 
impact of public discourse on redistribution is recognized in refined models 
involving voters who are driven by pure self-interest, and individuals who lack 
information. In the literature such distortions are often assumed, and the dual 
nature of the welfare state is also emphasized: firstly as a state that redistributes 
goods from the rich to the poor within generations (a ‘Robin Hood’ state) but at 
the same time one which accumulates savings to support a life-course model (a 
‘piggy bank’ state).
Our main thesis which grounds the empirical study can be deducted from this 
position: the reason for voter negligence of the interests of future generations 
is that the state’s redistribution discourse excludes intergenerational justice 
concerns, and focuses on the state’s ‘Robin Hood’ function. If intergenerational 
aspects were present in public discourse, voters would consider the associated 
moral sentiments as well, hence they would support reforms leading to the better 
representation of the interests of future generations. These include voting-rights 
reforms resulting in the greater incorporation of future generations’ interests 
in decision-making, besides direct decisions about redistribution. Basically, we 
hypothesize that if voters considered these factors, they would vote accordingly.
We analyzed support for such voting-right reforms through an empirical study 
in which we investigated whether framing of state redistribution dilemmas 
influences attitudes towards voting-right reforms. More explicitly, the main 
question was whether raising awareness about intergenerational dilemmas 
improves sensitivity to future generations’ rights and interests.
Such survey-based experiments face two challenges. First, critics of attitude 
research and framing research often claim that attitude changes due to framing 
do not model opinion formulation processes in real discourses. They represent 
ad hoc, short-term effects and respondents adapt to perceived expectations with 
their responses. Second, the claim is that those respondents who do have their 
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opinions influenced by real discourses would not respond to the hypothesized 
stimuli in the predicted way, although the topics of the frames used in the 
experiments do affect them.
Both claims represent grave critiques of  research that uses framing effects 
in experiments, but a method has been recently developed to respond to 
them. The former critiques build on two opposing models of ideal voters and 
psychological research has identified methods for determining with which 
model the personalities of respondents can be associated (Matthes 2007). One 
type of respondent has difficulty formulating opinions and uses easily accessible 
response patterns when facing non-trivial questions. In other contexts, however, 
they respond in a different way, without “carrying over” previous responses. 
Hence, the validity of their survey responses is quite low. These types of 
respondents are referred to as “memory-based information processors.” The 
second type of respondent easily formulates opinions which are consistent 
with earlier responses, but which are modified and reevaluated based on new 
information. The opinions of the latter are changed by simple manipulations 
only with dificulty, yet their response validity is higher as they are likely to 
carry over their attitudes to real situations without framing effects. Results from 
framing experiments are stronger if they involve respondents of the second type.
Considering the above, we formulated our hypotheses. The first assumption 
was that the discourse about state redistribution focuses mainly on 
intragenerational dilemmas (the “Robin Hood” state). Thus, our first hypothesis 
was that, compared to the control group, an intragenerational frame should 
not have considerable effects (H1). Our second hypothesis was the motivating 
assumption of our research: we hypothesized that discussion of intergenerational 
redistribution dilemmas before surveying attitudes towards the aforementioned 
voting-right reforms would improve support for those reforms (H2). However, 
considering the multiple approaches to voter behavior we assumed that this 
effect would be different among generations: weak for the elderly, stronger for 
the middle-aged, and strongest among the youngest (H3).
An important component of the literature about redistribution preferences is the 
relationship between ethnic prejudice and welfare preferences. In the literature on 
intergenerational redistribution, however, this is a marginal topic despite the fact 
that the theoretical connection is quite strong. However, in the Hungarian policy 
discourse about voting rights reforms this topic was emphasized. Namely, it has 
been expressed that providing additional rights to large families would simply 
increase the political weight of the roma, hence such reform proposals would face 
serious resistance from prejudiced voter groups. For this reason, we also included 
the issue of roma and benefits in our experiment as well, wording it in a way that 
would not present the dilemma as redistribution between roma and non-roma. 
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Instead, our ethnic frame only very shallowly suggested a connection between 
large families in need and the roma. We assumed that the ethnic frame would also 
decrease support for voting-right reforms (H4).
DATA AND METHODS
The empirical study involved a survey using an online quota sample of 1000 
respondents between the end of June and beginning of July 2016. The structure of 
the sample in terms of age, cohort, and regional distribution resembles the overall 
Hungarian population. However, given that the sample was conducted online, the 
proportion of uneducated respondents is lower than in the population overall, thus 
the raw responses are probably not representative of the population. However, 
our study does not focus on simple frequencies of responses (it was not designed 
to be similar to polls which precede referenda, or pre-surveys related to political 
decisions). Our sole purpose was to investigate the effects of the framing stimuli 
on responses to our questions (Schuman 2008). Recent results, especially from 
online surveys, show that the demographic differences between the sample and 
the population have negligible (or easily manageable) effects on such framing 
experiments (Mullinix et al. 2015; Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014). 
Our study focuses on possible reforms of the voting-system. We posed three 
attitude-related questions in relation to topic, asking respondents their opinions 
about the following reform-related options:
1.  For each child below the age of 18, a family should get an extra vote
2.  In referenda that influence the future of the state, the votes of young voters 
should should be awarded more weight than those of the elderly
3.  Similarly to in Austria, the voting age should be decreased to 16 years old
Respondents reported their level of their agreement using a four-item Likert-
scale. The three responses were processed into a composite variable that 
located respondents on an opinion-dimension defined by the factor analysis 
of responses to individual questions. We assumed that this latent dimension 
would measure the strength of opinions about the principle of improving future 
generations’ representation, separating this from specific aspects related to the 
survey questions. This factor score variable was our dependent variable and was 
present on the left side of our regression model.
Our experiment focuses on examining framing effects on political opinion. 
We created four random subgroups for the sample (250 respondents each; 
quotas were used regarding demographic properties on the total sample but not 
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on these sub-samples). Besides the control group one group was exposed to 
intergenerational and another one intragenerational frames during the survey, 
while the third group was exposed to a frame that was aimed at artificially 
creating associations between large families in poverty and the roma (we 
refer to this as ‘ethnic treatment’). The respective frames were employed at 
the beginning of the survey for the inter- and intragenerational redistribution 
groups, while the ‘ethnic treatment’ involved priming questions throughout 
the survey as a treatment. Following exposure to the frames, respondents were 
asked to respond to various questions about public policy and politics.
The framing consisted of two steps. First, an information video was shown 
to respondents with related infographics and an explanation of the respective 
dilemmas.7 The videos did not contain potential solutions, but only factual 
statements (numerical information), and exposed the dilemma of redistribution 
between old vs. young followed by rich vs. poor. The video was followed by 
a series of questions about attitudes towards redistribution, as outlined in the 
framing. Another set of questions then followed about redistribution in general, 
and only after these questions were the actual voting-right reform questions 
presented. In the ethnic treatment there was no informational video, and nor were 
respondents asked questions about redistribution from an inter/intragenerational 
perspective. Instead, this group answered a series of attitude questions about the 
poor and recipients of benefits, wherein stereotypical statements about roma and 
benefit recipients followed each other.
The information videos attempted to encourage respondents to think about the 
redistribution dilemmas presented therein, while the ethnic treatment was not 
specifically designed to provoke conscious association between the two factors.
RESULTS
As previously described, the respondents in our sample were asked three questions 
related to voting rights. The first one was about providing voting rights to parents, 
the second proposed increasing the weight of young generations in votes, while 
the third involved decreasing the voting age to 16 years following the example of 
Austria. Responses ranged from fully support to completely reject on a 4-level scale.
7  The video-vignette of the intragenerational redistribution frame is available here:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVjMlSmcooI 
The video-vignette of the intergenerational redistribution frame is available here:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLIiqdDNycs
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Respondents in general rejected each proposal. Giving additional voting 
rights to parents with underage children in the family was rejected by 62% of 
the control group (without framing), and only 17% of respondents agreed with 
this proposal to a smaller degree. Similarly, the proposal to increase the weight 
of younger generations’ votes was rejected by 56% of the control group and only 
one in six respondents agreed with it to a lesser degree. For both questions, 6% 
supported the proposals completely. Decreasing the voting age was also rejected 
by the majority of respondents (38% completely against, 32% supported, and 
only 12% expressed full support). In the control group, 30% were strictly against 
each proposal. However, in our sample 43% of the respondents agreed at least to 
a small degree to at least one of the proposals.
These proportions may indicate current trends, yet the results should be handled 
with care, and not only because of the small sample size (the control group consisting 
of 250 respondents). Our online sample that was optimized for this survey experiment 
did not properly represent the adult population in some important respects. Most 
importantly, educated respondents were over-represented in our sample. Note that 
those with low level of education (who did not graduate from high school) are more 
supportive of these proposals than educated respondents. 
As mentioned before, we used regression models to investigate the effect 
of framing on attitudes to maintaining the status-quo of intergenerational 
relations. The dependent variable in these regression models was a composite 
variable constructed by factor analysis of the three responses. The variable was 
standardized with higher values denoting “gerontocratic” preferences aimed at 
conserving the status quo, while low values express a preference for providing 
future generations and younger voters with more weight.
The first table contains three linear regression models which approximate the 
effect of experimental manipulations on preferences about voting rights based 
on the data from the sample. The first model compares the responses of the 
control group with the responses of the treatment groups (the simplest test of our 
second hypothesis, H2). The second model examines our hypotheses about the 
age-group dependent effects of age and framing (H1 and H3). 
In our experiment, many respondents were excluded from the sample due to 
the limitations of their devices (cell phones, typically) and were substituted by 
others. The most  interesting effect of this is the under-representation of young 
respondents in the groups with treatments involving information videos. But there 
were other less obvious differences due to the selection effects of the device on 
which the online survey was responded to. In order to control for such problems, 
we also estimated a model enriched with sociodemographic controls. We consider 
that this model best estimates the experimental effects, thus we focus on the 
results of it below – note that there are no differences between the second and the 
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third model with respect to the conclusions about experimental effects. The fit of 
the models shows that the explanatory power of the experimental treatments are 
quite low. The same holds for our model that includes an extended set of control 
variables (sex, education, income, residence, labor market status, household size, 
underage children, siblings, partisan and ideological position, faith).8
Table 1. Support for voting-rights reforms (composite  dependent variable). OLS 
regression estimations, full sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Experimental manipulation
Intergenerational frame 0.129 0.136§ 0.118§
(0.149) (0.271) (0.326)
Intragenerational frame 0.0379 0.108§ 0.0886§
(0.672) (0.374) (0.457)
‘Roma= poor large families’ frame 0.0673 0.0852 0.0820
 – middle-aged (0.452) (0.480) (0.490)
Age group
Young: 18-29 years -0.123 0.0105
(0.413) (0.952)
Old: 60-x years 0.202 0.0700
(0.212) (0.706)
Interaction: experimental manipulation X age 
Intergenerational#Young -0.464* -0.442*
(0.0700) (0.0796)
Intergenerational #Old -0.0218 -0.0542
(0.918) (0.793)
Intragenerational # Young -0.254 -0.209
(0.303) (0.387)
Intragenerational # Old -0.237 -0.238
(0.266) (0.255)
Poor Roma # Young -0.126 -0.113
(0.564) (0.597)
Poor Roma # Old -4.19e-05 0.0221
(1.000) (0.921)
Constants -0.0586 -0.0687 -0.683*
(0.355) (0.424) (0.0839)
N 1,000 1,000 1,000
R2 0.002 0.028 0.111
Controls NO NO YES
p values in parentheses  * p<0.1, § Effect size for middle-aged respondents
8  Based on our approximations, the statistical power of a sample size of 1000 is considerable. The 
model that includes the control variables in the table below would be able to reveal the effects of 
the intergenerational frame at 80% probability even if the model’s explanatory power improved 
by 0,7% (R2). This is the explanatory power of this frame among younger respondents. An effect 
causing a 2% increase in R2 could be shown in such a sample with 99.5% probability – using 
the estimation methods in STATA; results can be found here:  https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-
qpUqAOfZ1pb1FEc19NUHczeDA/view?usp=sharing  
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We analyzed the effect of the experimental manipulation separately for 
younger (18-29 years old), middle-aged (30-59 years old) and elderly (60+ years 
old) respondents. Estimations using these age groups indicate that mentioning 
stereotypes against roma and large families did not significantly influence 
attitudes towards the reforms. Those who were exposed to such stimuli did not 
support the status quo more than those in the control group. The effect size is 
comparable to that for political orientation (and not significant statistically).
The voting-rights preferences of respondents who participated in the 
intragenerational treatment did not differ significantly from the preferences of 
those in the control group. The opinions of younger and elderly respondents 
changed positively due to the treatment, but there were no changes in the case of 
middle-aged respondents. The influence of the intragenerational experimental 
manipulation was not significant in either group.
Our study focuses mainly on the effects of the treatment with the intergenerational 
frame. The middle-aged respondents in this group swung slightly towards rejecting 
the reforms, yet for the elderly the effect was barely noticeable (the effects and the 
difference between these two generations are not significant). Younger voters were 
significantly affected by the intergenerational frame, suggesting more support for 
their own interests and those of future generations, resulting in support for the 
voting rights reforms that were proposed. However, the effect is small as well, as 
shown in the third column of Table I (the parameter estimation of the interaction 
variable shows the effect of the frame in comparison with that for the middle-
aged generation). The framing practically shifted the opinions of the younger 
respondents with a third of the standard deviation.
To sum up, we conclude that the treatments did not have considerable effects 
on the opinions of  respondents, except for the younger ones whose opinions 
were affected by the intergenerational frame. Note though that we cannot 
accept responses to questions about such complex and abstract matters without 
skepticism. The paradigm of standard survey-based attitude-related research is 
often criticized by questioning the external validity of research into abstract 
issues that do not exist in everyday life. We rely on another type of critique 
that emphasizes that there are numerous differences between people when it 
comes to revealing their opinions and thinking about such complex questions 
(Bizer et al. 2006). Critics claim that a considerable fraction of respondents 
have difficulties formulating opinions about such matters. Their responses 
concerning such topics are rather ad-hoc and less consciously arrived at. 
Another fraction of people more consciously form their opinions and it is more 
difficult to artificially divert them using latent stimuli. Due to this conscious 
process of opinion formation they may react better to explicit information that 
requires rational reflection.
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In our study we measured the ease of opinion formulation using a set of 
questions typically used for such purposes in the literature (“need to evaluate” 
scale [Bizer et al. 2004]) and then split our sample into two (as equally sized as 
possible). The first part consisted of less conscious respondents, while the second 
part contained those that had less difficulty with opinion-formulation. We then 
approximated the same regression models as above for these two subsamples 
individually, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Support for voting-rights reforms (composite  dependent variable). OLS 
regression estimations in subsamples based on respondent types 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES M2 memo based
M3 memo 
based
M2 online 
proc.
M3 online 
proc.
Experimental manipulation
Intergenerational frame – middle-aged 0.304* 0.304* -0.0596 -0.0978
(0.0641) (0.0599) (0.751) (0.599)
Intragenerational frame– middle-aged 0.0922 0.0753 0.115 0.107
(0.588) (0.653) (0.491) (0.528)
‘Roma= poor large families’ frame 0.281* 0.280* -0.150 -0.126
 – middle-aged (0.0919) (0.0933) (0.383) (0.458)
Age group
Young: 18-29 years -0.271 -0.0583 -0.0160 -0.0225
(0.213) (0.821) (0.937) (0.924)
Old: 60-x years 0.0730 -0.0117 0.203 0.165
(0.773) (0.967) (0.326) (0.504)
Interaction: experimental manipulationXage 
Intergenerational#Young -0.202 -0.228 -0.909** -0.747*
(0.541) (0.486) (0.0360) (0.0844)
Intergenerational #Old -0.121 -0.185 0.103 0.0728
(0.710) (0.567) (0.713) (0.792)
Intragenerational # Young 0.0170 -0.0108 -0.507 -0.444
(0.962) (0.975) (0.126) (0.175)
Intragenerational # Old 0.127 0.0668 -0.483* -0.441
(0.701) (0.838) (0.0777) (0.108)
Poor Roma # Young -0.367 -0.449 0.178 0.202
(0.240) (0.146) (0.551) (0.493)
Poor Roma # Old 0.0260 -0.00229 0.0957 0.0696
(0.939) (0.995) (0.743) (0.807)
Constants -0.242** -1.150** 0.135 0.181
(0.0451) (0.0402) (0.259) (0.756)
N 520 520 480 480
R2 0.043 0.149 0.044 0.148
Controls NO YES NO YES
p values in parentheses ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data show that more conscious respondents were – according to our 
expectations – more positively affected by the intergenerational frame. Similarly 
to previous results, the elderly did not react to the frame, and the middle-aged 
only reacted to a very small degree (not significant statistically) in terms of 
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support for voting-rights reforms. Among younger respondents this change 
is not only statistically significant, but  its extent is also approximately one 
standard deviation for the composite variable that describes support for voting-
rights reforms. Also, these results are robust for changes in the age groups: the 
positive effect is observed even when the upper age boundary of the younger age 
group is increased from 29 years to 34 years. 
Investigation of the effects of experimental manipulations in the cases of 
the different voting-rights reform proposals is also interesting (note that a 
composite dependent variable was analyzed above). For the reasons outlined 
above, we only demonstrate regression results for more conscious respondents. 
The first question concerned voting reform in the shape of giving extra voting 
rights to parents for their children. Results are very similar to those obtained 
in the case of the composite variable. Elderly respondents are unaffected by 
the intergenerational redistribution frame, while it slightly increases support for 
reforms in the case of the middle-aged and has a significant positive effect for 
young respondents. Similarly, the intragenerational frame has a positive effect 
on support of this reform, yet to a much lesser extent.
The second reform addressed the weight of the votes of younger voters. 
This proposal directly separates the interests of future generations and current 
generations and creates the biggest contrast between them. Perhaps this was the 
reason that numerous respondents refrained from responding to support the self-
interest of their own generation. Nevertheless, the effect of age on opinions was 
not stronger than in the case of the previous question, and the intergenerational 
frame had smaller effects on younger and middle-aged respondents. The effect 
of the intragenerational frame was smaller compared to the previous question 
as well (however, this question apparently had a different effect on the middle-
aged compared to the elderly and young respondents; this contrast resulted in 
significant regression parameters).
The third, much less radical form of reform (only marginally related to 
intergenerational justice) concerned lowering the age of voting. It is not 
surprising that we did not experience any effect of either frame among the most 
conscious respondents.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In our study we investigated the effect of extending voting rights to future 
generations. From a moral point of view, we may be correct to doubt the wisdom 
of directly providing voting rights to children (due to their lack of decision-
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making capabilities given their age and maturity), or giving their parents 
extra voting rights (as parents may abuse this right to pursue their own self-
interests). Despite this, it is clear that while some pillars of the representation 
of future generations are already defined, these have no influence whatsoever 
on the course of democratic elections. These pillars include representation in 
the case of environmental questions (institutions or constitutional barriers), 
legal representation, and the revisions of some governmental decisions by 
professional bodies and committees representing future generations (such as 
monetary councils). Even in these cases the focus is not on giving the choice to 
future generations, but on influencing issues that could have long-term effects 
on future generations. 
In our empirical study we investigated support for reform proposals that 
would improve the intergenerational justice of the voting system using an 
online survey, where we framed this topic in different ways. Our main question 
concerned the voting rights of children, and we inquired about support for three 
reform proposals: giving extra voting rights to children (and delegating that vote 
to parents); changing the weight of the votes of younger voters; and decreasing 
the voting age.
The first proposal does not involve the explicit participation of future 
generations in voting, but rather delegates voting rights to parents or other 
representative institutions. This raises numerous practical questions, but these 
are outside the scope of our current work. The second proposal would not include 
children among voters, but would increase the weight of the vote of younger 
voters to counter the asymmetry due to current negative demographic trends. The 
third proposal was to include a small proportion of future generations in voting 
by decreasing the voting age. Attitudes towards these reforms were surveyed 
using differently framed surveys: one frame emphasized the intergenerational 
aspects of the welfare system, another frame introduced the intragenerational 
redistribution dilemma (poor vs. rich), while the third promoted an ethnic focus 
as well (roma and large families in relief) – here we used a priming technique 
instead of framing for the survey. Naturally, there was one unframed version of 
the survey to provide us with a control group. 
Results indicate that these proposals are unpopular, irrespective of framing. 
We found that the interests of future generations were less important to the 
elderly – however, it is vital to emphasize that these issues are not generally 
present in public discourse. The purpose of our framing was not to provide 
information about the topic, but to present various redistribution dilemmas. 
Despite our expectations, framing did not significantly change responses, and 
nor could we identify significant relationships between support for the proposed 
reforms and some sociodemographic variables. This situation was not improved 
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extensively, even by controlling for strong-opinion-formulating voters (the only 
exception to this were more conscious young respondents). Another surprising 
result was that ethnic priming did not influence responses either. One may 
conclude that the problem of representing future generations in the democratic 
voting system – either directly, or by delegating votes – is so removed from 
everyday issues that a typical survey respondent may not be able respond in a 
meaningful way. 
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